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he central idea behind an important branch of modern public ﬁnance
literature is that imperfect government information about taxpayers’
individual characteristics limits the economic outcomes attainable by
taxation and redistribution policies. This idea, ﬁrst explored in a seminal
article by James Mirrlees (1971), provides a framework for studying the fun-
damental question of how income should be taxed.1 In this framework, which




tribute to our understanding of the observed tax institutions and can serve as
a basis for deriving normative prescriptions for tax policy reforms.
In this article, we use the Mirrlees approach to study the question of opti-
mal income taxation in an environment in which agents can avoid taxation by
hidingincome. Inthisenvironment,thegovernmentcannotobserveindividual
incomeoftheagentsinthepopulation, butonlytheincomethatagentschoose
to display. Income displayed may be less than actual income. However, the
process of income hiding is costly; when income is being concealed, some
resources are wasted on income-hiding activities. The concealed income is
never observed by the government; it is consumed by the agents in private.
True income, therefore, cannot be taxed. Taxes only can be levied on the
displayed income.
I would like to thank Marina Azzimonti-Renzo, Brian Minton, Ned Prescott, and Alex Wolman
for their helpful comments. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and not
necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond or the Federal Reserve System.
1 Stiglitz (1987) provides an overview of early contributions to this literature. Recent contri-
butions, which are mostly concerned with dynamic models (e.g., Kocherlakota 2005 and Albanesi
and Sleet 2006), are reviewed in Kocherlakota (2006).78 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
The government’s objective is to use redistributive taxation to provide
agents with insurance against the individual income risk. The income con-
cealment technology available to agents restricts the amount of tax revenue
that can be raised and used for redistribution. If the marginal tax rate applied
to income level y is higher than the agents’ cost to conceal the yth dollar of
their income, it is in the best interest of all agents whose true income is y to
conceal the last dollar of their income, display income y − 1, and incur the
concealment cost, rather than to display y fully and pay the high marginal tax.
Therefore, if the marginal tax rate on y is too high, no one will display y and
the marginal gain in the amount of government revenue raised from y will be
zero. Crucial here is the level of the concealment cost. The maximal amount
of revenue the government can raise is determined by the structure of the unit
income concealment cost across all income levels in the population.
An optimal tax system implements the best scheme for income redistri-
bution among all those feasible under the income concealment technology
available to the agents. We characterize optimal income tax structures under
a ﬂexible speciﬁcation of the income concealment cost function. Our main
result is that progressive income taxes are optimal in our model when the unit
cost of income hiding is increasing with true realized income.
This result contrasts the characterizations of optimal marginal income tax
rates obtained in the existing literature. Following Mirrlees (1971), virtually
all papers in the private-information-based optimal taxation literature study
environments in which agents have private information about their individual
productivity.2 In these environments, each agent’s income is the product of
his skill and effort. While income is publicly observable, individual skill and
effort are not. Taxes, therefore, can be a function of the observed income but
cannotbeconditionedontheunobservableskilloreffort. Animportantfeature
of optimal taxes obtained by Mirrlees in this private-skill environment is that
the optimal income tax schedule is eventually regressive: marginal income
tax rates are decreasing for income levels close to the top of the population
distribution of income. This feature of the optimal income tax system in
private-skill economies has been shown in subsequent studies to be robust to
assumptions about the support of the skill distribution, heterogeneity of labor,
and general equilibrium effects (see Stiglitz 1987 for a review).
Our main result demonstrates that the prescriptions for optimal income
taxation obtained under the Mirrlees approach are very sensitive to the
2Varian (1980) and Albanesi (2006) are exceptions. These papers study optimal tax structures
in models with moral hazard, i.e., in situations in which agents can take private actions prior to
the resolution of the underlying uncertainty. The environment we study in this article is radically
different, since in our model, agents can take a private action (i.e., conceal income) after the
uncertainty is realized. Our model is an application, as well as an extension, of the costly state
falsiﬁcation (CSF) model of Lacker and Weinberg (1989). In Section 7, we discuss the relationship
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exogenous speciﬁcation of economic fundamentals and informational fric-
tions. If the underlying friction is the unobservability of skill and effort,
optimal marginal tax rates eventually have to decrease. If the friction is the
possibility of hidden income falsiﬁcation, then increasing marginal income
tax rates may be optimal.
This lack of robustness of the theoretical prescriptions obtained in the
Mirrlees approach makes apparent that empirical work is needed to determine
what are “the right” frictions—the frictions that could be used to derive useful
policy recommendations. This question is beyond the scope of this article.
However, the optimality of progressive income taxation obtained in our in-
come falsiﬁcation environment is consistent with the observed progressivity
of income tax systems used in many countries, including the United States.
In addition to the main result, we obtain an auxiliary result, which is more
generally useful for studying the environments with costly state falsiﬁcation,
i.e.,environmentsinwhichitiscostlytoconcealincome. Thisresultidentiﬁes
subadditivity of the concealment cost function as a sufﬁcient condition for the
optimalityofno-falsiﬁcationallocations,inwhichdisplayedincomecoincides
with true realized income across the whole support of the income distribution.
Slemrod andYitzhaki (2002) provide an overview of a large existing liter-
ature on tax avoidance and evasion. This literature deﬁnes tax evasion as
criminal tax avoidance. Tax avoidance, in turn, is deﬁned as taking full
advantage of legal methods of reducing tax obligations. The literature on
tax avoidance is mainly descriptive (see Stiglitz 1985). Virtually all existing
theoretical models of tax evasion are built around the costly state veriﬁcation
model of Townsend (1979). In these models, agents can underreport income
and the tax authority can perform an audit, i.e., discover, at a cost, the true re-
alized income. The underreported income, if discovered, is taxed at a penalty
rate. Most papers in this literature restrict income tax rates or penalty rates,
or both, to be linear in income, some take the penalty rates as exogenous.
This article differs from the papers in this literature in two respects. First,
we assume that true realized income can never be discovered by the tax au-
thority, and, therefore, never taxed (thus, there are no penalty tax rates in our
model). Theinterpretationofthisassumptionisconsistentwiththeliterature’s
notion of tax avoidance, rather than evasion. In our model, income hiding is
meant to represent all costly but legal actions that agents take to reduce their
tax obligations. In reality, these actions involve shifting income across time
and tax jurisdictions, transferring the ownership of productive assets, attribut-
ing income to tax-exempt sources, etc. All these activities decrease taxable
income, and are, usually, costly. In the model, we abstract from the speciﬁc
nature of these activities. Instead of introducing them in a speciﬁc form, we
model tax avoidance indirectly by introducing a general income concealment
technology similar to the costly state falsiﬁcation technology of Lacker and
Weinberg (1989).80 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
The modeling methodology is the second important difference between
this article and the existing literature on taxation constrained by tax avoidance
and evasion. As mentioned before, we use the Mirrlees approach, in which
resource feasibility and the underlying friction in the environment (private
information) are the only source of restrictions on the set of taxes that can
be used by the government. To emphasize, in the Mirrlees approach, no
exogenousrestrictionsonthesetofavailablepolicyinstrumentsareintroduced
beyond those implied by the fundamentals of the environment. The existing
taxevasionliterature,incontrast,introducesexogenousrestrictionsonincome
and penalty tax rates.3
In order to solve a Mirrlees optimal taxation problem, we go through
three main steps. First, we provide a complete speciﬁcation of all economic
fundamentals that constitute the model environment. Second, in the speciﬁed
environment, we characterize the set of most desirable economic outcomes.
Third, we obtain a characterization of optimal tax structures by deriving a tax
system that implements an optimal outcome in a market equilibrium of this
economy.
This article is organized into seven sections in which we go through the
three steps of the Mirrlees optimal taxation problem. Sections 1 through 3
provide necessary deﬁnitions. In Section 1, a macroeconomic version of the
costlystatefalsiﬁcationenvironmentisdeﬁned. InSection2, wespecifywhat
constitutes an outcome (allocation) and a best outcome (constrained optimal
allocation)inthisenvironment. InSection3,weprovideaformaldeﬁnitionof
ﬁscal implementation of an optimal allocation. In Section 4, we characterize
and implement the optimum of a benchmark model in which government
informationiscomplete. Section5isdevotedtocharacterizationoftheoptimal
allocation under costly state falsiﬁcation, that is, with incomplete government
information. Our main result is derived in Section 6, in which we study ﬁscal
implementation of the constrained optimum. In Section 7, we discuss the
extent to which our results can be generalized with respect to the considered
classofincomefalsiﬁcationcostfunctions. Wealsodiscusstherelationofour
speciﬁcation of the falsiﬁcation technology to the speciﬁcations considered in
the costly state falsiﬁcation literature. Section 8 concludes the article.
3 In introducing exogenous restrictions on the set of tax instruments available to the govern-
ment, most of the existing tax evasion literature follows the so-called Ramsey approach, in which
exogenous restrictions on policy instruments (linearity, most commonly) are imposed. Schroyen
(1997) studies a tax evasion model with nonlinear income taxes and exogenous penalties.B. Grochulski: Optimal Taxation with Tax Avoidance 81
1. ENVIRONMENT
Considerasingle-periodeconomywithacontinuumofexanteidenticalagents
whose preferences are represented by the expected utility function
E [u(c)],
where u is twice continuously differentiable with u  > 0, u   < 0.
Agentsfaceidiosyncraticincomerisk. Atthebeginningoftheperiod,each
agent receives individual income y ∈ [y0,y 1]. The cumulative distribution
function of income is F. Given a law of large numbers, F(y)represents both
the ex ante probability of an agent’s income realization less than or equal to
y, and the ex post fraction of agents whose realized income is less than or
equal to y. Aggregate income in this economy, denoted by Y, is equal to the
expected value of each agent’s individual income, i.e.,




Individual realizations of income y are not immediately observable to the
public, but, instead, can be, in part or in whole, privatively concealed before
income becomes publicly observable. The process of concealment of income
is costly: a fraction of each dollar concealed is lost in the process of hiding it
from public view. The remaining fraction of each concealed dollar, denoted
by λ(y) ∈ [0,1], however, remains in hidden possession of an agent and is
available for consumption. Note that the cost to conceal a dollar of income
can vary with the income level.
Giventhisconcealmenttechnology,theamountofhidden(i.e.,concealed)
consumption available to an agent whose realized income is y ∈ [y0,y 1] and




The remaining portion of the concealed income
 y
˜ y




islostasadeadweightcostoffalsiﬁcation. Theunconcealedpartofincome, ˜ y,
becomes public information and, therefore, is subject to social redistribution
(i.e., taxation).
2. CONSTRAINED OPTIMUM DEFINED
Since individual income realizations are stochastic and agents are risk-averse,
there are welfare gains to be realized from social insurance. Insurance can be82 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
provided by committing ex ante to redistribute ex post some resources from
thosewhoserealizedincomeishightothosewhoseincomeislow. Whatisthe
best possible scheme of income redistribution for providing social insurance
in this environment?
In this section, we introduce a standard notion of constrained optimal-
ity and deﬁne constrained optimal social redistribution mechanisms. These
mechanisms are deﬁned as solutions to the so-called social planning problem.
This section is focused on deﬁning the social planning problem under the pos-
sibility of income falsiﬁcation by the agents. Our discussion of the solution
of this problem is deferred to Section 5.
Mechanisms
The social objective is to choose a set of rules governing all interactions be-
tweenagentssothattheﬁnaloutcomeoftheseinteractionsisthebestpossible.
Agents possess private information about their income and can take private
action (that is, hide income). The rules to be decided on, therefore, have
to prescribe how agents are to communicate their private information, what





1. The mechanism itself is committed to by all parties.
2. Agents receive private information.
3. Communication takes place.
4. Agents take private actions.
5. Redistribution takes place.
6. Agents consume.
Thesocialplanningproblemistochooseamechanismthatleadstoaﬁnal
allocation of consumption that maximizes the ex ante expected utility of each
agent in this economy.4
The set of mechanisms that can be used is very large. In particular, since
communication is costless in our environment, one can use mechanisms with
extensive communication between agents. However, essentially all that needs
to be communicated is, at most, the agents’ private information about their
4As all agents are ex ante identical, the expected utility of the representative agent is a natural
choice of the social objective function, which is widely used in macroeconomics. In particular,
this objective is consistent with the standard notion of Pareto optimality.B. Grochulski: Optimal Taxation with Tax Avoidance 83
realized income. All other communication is superﬂuous, that is, cannot
lead to a welfare gain. This intuition is formalized in a general result called
the Revelation Principle. This result states that when searching for an opti-
mal mechanism, it is enough to search among the so-called direct-revelation
incentive-compatible (DRIC) mechanisms.
In a direct-revelation mechanism, all that agents communicate is simply
theirprivateinformation,i.e.,inourcase,theindividualrealizationsofincome.
A mechanism is incentive compatible (IC) in our environment if, given a
recommendation of private action to be taken and a resource redistribution
plan, all agents ﬁnd it optimal to reveal their information truthfully and follow
the recommended course of action. The Revelation Principle states that any
ﬁnal allocation that can be attained with some mechanism can also be attained
withaDRICmechanism. Thus,whenonesearchesforanoptimalmechanism,
it is enough to look at DRIC mechanisms, which we do hereafter.
To summarize, under a DRIC mechanism, six stages of interactions be-
tween agents take place according to the following timeline:
1. Society announces the recommended amount of income hiding, y −
˜ y(y),foreachactualrealizationofincomey ∈ [y0,y 1],andcommitsto
a schedule c for redistribution of displayed income ˜ y, where, for each
˜ y ∈ [y0,y 1], c(˜ y) denotes the amount of resources publicly assigned
to each agent who displays income ˜ y.
2. Agents receive their individual income realizations y.
3. Agents communicate their realizations of y.
4. Agents follow the action recommended by hiding y−˜ y(y)and making
˜ y(y)available to the public.
5. Redistribution of the unconcealed income ˜ y occurs according to c.







˜ y(y)λ(t)dt represents the hidden (not observed by the public)
consumption of the unwasted portion of the concealed income.
Incentive Compatibility
Under the Revelation Principle, the choice of the recommendation schedule
˜ y(y)is constrained by the requirement of incentive compatibility. Since both
the actual income realized and the concealed fraction of it are private infor-
mation, it is not possible to determine if agents really hide and display the
amounts recommended. Thus, the recommendation has to be consistent with
agents’ self-interest. In order to precisely describe this requirement, let us84 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
introduce the following piece of notation. Given that society is committed to
redistributing the unconcealed income according to the allocation c, let θc(y)
denote the set of income display levels that maximize utility attained by an
agent whose true realized income is y. That is,










where  (y) is the set of all income levels that an agent whose actual income
is y can feasibly declare as his true income without being discovered.5 In our
environment, for each y ∈ [y0,y 1], the set  (y) is given by
 (y) = {˜ y |˜ y ≤ y, and ˜ y ∈ suppF }.
There are two constraints that determine  (y): the individual resource con-
straint and the so-called support constraint. Since the unconcealed amount ˜ y
becomes publicly observable, ˜ y cannot be larger than y, which is represented
by the individual resource feasibility constraint. The set suppF contains all
values of income y ∈ [y0,y 1] such that the probability of income realization
y is strictly positive under the distribution F. As the distribution F and its
support are publicly known, an agent declaring an income realization that
is impossible under F, clearly, is lying. This is represented by the support
constraint.
Arecommendedincomedeclarationschedule ˜ y :[ y0,y 1]→ [y0,y 1]anda
consumption redistribution allocation c :[ y0,y 1] → R are (jointly) incentive
compatible if
˜ y(y) ∈ θc(y) (4)
for all y ∈ [y0,y 1].
Therequirementofincentivecompatibilitystatesthatamechanismcannot
give any agent an incentive to deviate from the recommended course of ac-
tion. The fact that θc(y) is not necessarily a singleton [for some consumption
allocations, there will be multiple solutions to the maximization problem on
the right-hand side of (3)], is not generally considered a problem. If the rec-
ommended action is a selection from θc(y), agents have no reason to deviate.
We denote the desired selection from θc(y) by ˜ yc(y). This notation explicitly
recognizes the fact that incentive compatibility is a joint requirement on the
recommended action ˜ y(y)and the consumption allocation schedule c.
Under various particular speciﬁcations of the income distribution F, the
ICrequirement(4)canbewrittenoutmoreexplicitly. Asanexample,consider
5 Note that detectable deviations can be deterred by a commitment to punish them strongly
enough so that no agent ﬁnds it optimal to use them. The set  (y) describes all undetectable
deviations, which cannot be deterred in this simple way.B. Grochulski: Optimal Taxation with Tax Avoidance 85
the case in which suppF = {y0,y 1} with
Pr{y = y0} = F(y 0),
Pr{y = y1} = 1 − F(y 0),
where 0 <F ( y 0)<1. In this case, we have  (y1) = {y0,y 1} while, due
to the individual resource constraint ˜ y ≤ y,  (y0) = {y0}. Agents with
the low income realization y0 have no possibility of hiding income, so no IC
constraints are required for them. The IC condition (4) for those with high















for θ ∈  (y1) = {y0,y 1}. Since the utility function u enters both sides of this
constraint symmetrically, the above IC condition for utilities is equivalent to








for θ ∈  (y1) = {y0,y 1}. This condition is trivially satisﬁed for θ =˜ yc(y1),
which leaves one IC condition for each possible display recommendation
˜ yc(y1). In particular, for the recommendation of full display, ˜ yc(y1) = y1, the
IC condition is given by




which simply states that for the full display recommendation to be IC, the
publicly assigned consumption c(y1) must be at least equal to the sum of the
publicly assigned consumption c(y0) and the hidden consumption
 y1
y0 λ(t)dt
that high-income agents can obtain by hiding the amount y1 − y0.
InSection5,wefocusonanotherspecialcase,namely,thefullsupportcase
in which suppF = [y0,y 1]. Our general speciﬁcation of the IC requirement
encompasses both of these extreme cases, as well as a variety of intermediate
speciﬁcations.
Resource Feasibility
Among the incentive-compatible mechanisms, we are interested in those that
are self-ﬁnancing, or resource feasible. A DRIC mechanism is resource fea-
sible if the promised consumption allocation c can be delivered without using
any more resources than those displayed by agents. That is, a DRIC mecha-




c(˜ yc(y)) −˜ yc(y)

dF(y) ≤ 0. (5)86 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Forbrevity,adirect-revelationincentive-compatibleandresource-feasible
mechanism will be called an incentive-feasible (IF) mechanism.
The Social Planning Problem
Thesocialplanningprobleminourenvironmentistoﬁndawelfare-maximizing
incentive-feasible mechanism (˜ yc,c). This social planning problem can be
writtenconciselyasthefollowingmathematicalprogrammingproblem,which




























c(˜ yc(y)) −˜ yc(y)

dF(y) ≤ 0. (7)




1. Consumption is delivered to agents in two ways: the publicly observ-
able consumption c(˜ yc(y)) and the hidden consumption
 y
˜ yc(y) λ(t)dt.
The public consumption allocation c depends on the true realization of
income y only through the displayed amount ˜ yc(y). In general, one
could allow for c to be a function of both the reported income y and
the displayed income ˜ y. For incentive reasons, however, the direct de-
pendence of c ony has to be trivial. To see this, let c depend on both
˜ y and y, and suppose that there exist realizations y1 and y2 in [y0,y 1]
such that
c(˜ yc(y1),y1)>c (˜ yc(y2),y2).
If ˜ yc(y1) =˜ yc(y2), agents with true realized income y2 will not reveal
it truthfully. Instead, they will report y1 because this report gives them




λ(t)dt > c(˜ yc(y2),y2) +
 y2
˜ yc(y1)
λ(t)dt.B. Grochulski: Optimal Taxation with Tax Avoidance 87
Thus, ˜ yc(y1) =˜ yc(y2) must imply that c(˜ yc(y1),y1) = c(˜ yc(y2),y2)
for all y1 and y2 in [y0,y 1], i.e., the direct dependence of c on the re-
vealedincomehastobetrivial. Intuitively,givenaﬁxeddisplayamount
˜ y, announcements of y are “cheap talk,” which should be ignored.
2. Given the “cheap talk” property of the revealed income y, the directly
revealed information about y is not used in consumption assignment c.
Thus, the third stage of the general DRIC mechanism, at which agents
reveal their actual income y, can be skipped. We see that, in the CSF
model, a direct-revelation mechanism does not have to actually call for
direct revelation of the realized uncertainty.
3. Since the utility function u is strictly increasing, a recommendation
˜ yc(y) is incentive compatible if and only if it maximizes the consump-
tion of the agent with realized income y. Thus, the function u can be
dropped from the objective on the right-hand side of (6), which makes
the IC constraint linear in c.
4. The IF mechanisms discussed above operate under the assumption that
society can fully commit ex ante to redistributing resources ex post
according to the agreed upon plan, c. This assumption is important. In
general, for incentive reasons, it is ex ante optimal for c to redistribute
displayed resources ˜ yc(y) partially. Ex post, however, agents cannot
hide resources that have already been revealed. At this point, if society
could reconsider the allocation policy c, it would prefer to redistribute
the revealed income more fully (take more from those who reveal a
lot). We assume that society can commit ex ante to not reconsidering c
ex post. If it could not commit to c, agents would not display income
accordingto ˜ yc(y),and,ineffect,lessinsurancecouldbeimplemented.
3. FISCAL IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED
In the Mirrlees approach to the problem of optimal taxation, an optimal tax
system is deﬁned as one that obtains optimal allocation of resources as an
equilibrium of a market economy with taxes. Having deﬁned optimal alloca-
tions in the previous section, we devote this section to deﬁning equilibrium in
a market economy with taxes. In our simple environment, in which income
is given to agents exogenously, all redistribution of income is done through
taxes and thus there is no need for markets. Thus, the general market/tax
mechanism can be specialized to a simple tax mechanism, which we deﬁne
below.
Let us then assume that the task of implementation of the optimal social
redistribution policy, along with the power to tax all unconcealed income, is
giventoagovernment. ThegovernmentchoosesataxfunctionT :[ y0,y 1] →
R, where T(˜ y) represents the tax levied on agents whose declared income is88 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
˜ y. Taxes can be negative, in which case they represent net transfers from the
government to the agents.
The timing of events under a tax mechanism is as follows:
1. The government commits to a tax function T.
2. Agents receive their individual income realizations y.
3. Agents hide the amount y −˜ y(y)and display ˜ y(y).
4. Redistribution of the unconcealed income ˜ y occurs according to T.
5. Agents with income y whose displayed income is ˜ y(y)consume




where ˜ y(y) − T(˜ y(y)) is the after-tax unconcealed income, and  y
˜ y(y)λ(t)dt is the hidden consumption of the unwasted portion of the
concealed income.
Note that, unlike the direct-revelation mechanism used in the social plan-
ning problem, the tax mechanism does not specify any recommendation on
what portion of realized income y is to be hidden. In a tax mechanism, agents
are simply confronted with a tax schedule T. Agents must make the decision
on how much income to hide and how much to display, without any explicit
recommendation.
Toﬁndoutwhatallocationofconsumptionisimplementedbyataxsched-
ule T, which we need to know in order to evaluate welfare attained by T,w e
needtopredicthowmuchincomeagentsofvariousincomelevelswillconceal
at stage 3 of the above mechanism, given that they know T is the tax schedule
they will face at stage 4. This can be done by ﬁnding, for each T, the set of
solutions to the agents’individual utility maximization problem.
Thisproblemisformulatedasfollows. Agentsofincomey chooseincome
displayed ˜ y ≤ y, public consumption cP, and hidden consumption cH so as
to maximize utility
u(cH + cP),





and the after-tax budget constraint for public consumption, which under the
tax function T is given by
cP ≤˜ y − T(˜ y).
Let us denote by θT(y) the set of individually optimal display levels for
agent y under taxes T, and let ˜ yT(y) be any selection from this set. Clearly,B. Grochulski: Optimal Taxation with Tax Avoidance 89
since u is increasing, given an individually optimal displayed income level
˜ yT(y), individually optimal hidden and public consumption levels are such











A tax schedule T implements an optimal mechanism (˜ y∗,c ∗) if the fol-
lowing two conditions are met:
˜ y∗(y) ∈ θT(y) (8)
for each y ∈ [y0,y 1], and
c∗(˜ y) =˜ y − T(˜ y) (9)
for each ˜ y ∈ [y0,y 1].
The ﬁrst condition in the above deﬁnition says that the tax schedule T
must be such that the socially optimal hiding policy ˜ y∗ is individually opti-
mal in the tax mechanism under schedule T. Intuitively, this condition is a
form of incentive compatibility requirement on the tax system T. The second
conditionrequiresthat, foreachlevelofdisplayedincome ˜ y, thetransferspre-
scribed by T exactly replicate the transfers prescribed by the socially optimal
redistribution schedule c∗. We will refer to (9) as the replication condition.
The implementation conditions (8) and (9) guarantee that the hidden and
public consumption delivered by the tax mechanism T exactly replicate the
hidden and public consumption of the optimal DRIC mechanism (˜ y∗,c ∗) for
each y ∈ [y0,y 1]. Therefore, welfare attained by the tax mechanism T is
equal to the maximal welfare attainable in this environment. For this reason,
a tax system that implements an optimum is called an optimal tax system.
Also, transfers implemented by an optimal T are budget feasible for the




























which means that net tax revenue is nonnegative under T. The inequality
abovefollowsfrom(7), i.e., thefactthat(˜ y∗,c ∗)isresourcefeasible. Theﬁrst
equality follows from the implementation condition (9), and the second from
the implementation condition (8).
In this article, we are interested in a characterization of a tax system T
that is optimal in the environment deﬁned in Section 2, in which hiding of
income is costly.90 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
4. SOLVING THE FULL INFORMATION BENCHMARK CASE
Before we proceed to the optimal taxation problem with income hiding, we
describe in this short section the solution to the optimal taxation problem in
an environment in which income hiding is not possible. This case serves as a
benchmarkagainstwhichwecancompareoptimalallocationsandtaxsystems
obtained in environments with income falsiﬁcation.
When income cannot be hidden, we can think of it as being public infor-
mation as soon as it is realized. Thus, there is no private information to be
communicated, nor is there any private action to be taken. The only object
that needs to be speciﬁed by a mechanism in the full information case is the
allocation of consumption c(y) for each realized income level y ∈ [y0,y 1].
Resource feasibility is the sole constraint that the consumption allocation c





it is the full-insurance allocation under which all income risk is insured and
thus all agents’consumption is the same, i.e.,
c(y) = cFI
for all y ∈ [y0,y 1]. Why? Any allocation with unequal consumption can
be improved upon, since all agents have the same preferences with marginal
utilitydecreasinginconsumption. Itissociallybeneﬁcialtoredistributeaunit
of consumption from those who have more to those who have less because
the utility gain to the poorer caused by such a transfer is larger than the utility
loss to the richer and, hence, the total social welfare is increased. Under full
information, such a transfer, as self-ﬁnancing, is feasible. Thus, the optimal
redistribution scheme is to allocate consumption equally to all.
What is the maximal level cFI of the same-for-all consumption that can




cFIdF(y) = cFI, (10)
that is, each agent’s consumption equals per capita income.
How can this allocation be implemented with a tax system? Since, ob-
viously, there is no hidden consumption in the public information case, each
agent’s ﬁnal consumption is simply equal to the consumption of publicly
assigned resources. Therefore, the only condition for implementation is the
condition
cFI = y − T(y)
for all y ∈ [y0,y 1]. Using (10), we conclude that the tax system
T(y)= y − YB. Grochulski: Optimal Taxation with Tax Avoidance 91
is optimal in the full information benchmark.
In the full information benchmark case, the optimal marginal tax rate is
100 percent. Agents with the realized income y0 pay a tax of y0 −Y, which is
a negative number, i.e., they receive a transfer. As realized income increases
in the population, the size of the transfer from the government to the agents
decreases 1 to 1 with income. The agents whose realized income is exactly
equal to the average income Y pay zero. All income above the average level
Y is taxed out. The implemented distribution of consumption is uniform: all
agents consume Y.
5. CHARACTERIZING CONSTRAINED OPTIMAL
ALLOCATIONS
As the ﬁrst step toward a characterization of optimal taxes in the class of
environment with private income and private action, we characterize in this
section optimal allocations of those environments.
Westartoutbynotingthatthefullinformationoptimumcannotbeachieved
in the private information case when the cost of falsiﬁcation is less than 100
percent. For the full information optimum to be implementable, it must be the
case that




for all y and all θ ∈  (y), which, given that λ is nonnegative, is true only if
λ(t) = 0 for all t ∈suppF.
Intuitively, the full-insurance allocation cFI does not give agents any
incentive to display income, as consumption publicly assigned to agents is
independent of income they display. If λ is not identically equal to zero,
agents can beneﬁt from hiding income. Since low declared income does not
cause any loss of publicly assigned consumption, all agents will display the
lowest possible income realization, i.e., y0. The promise of cFI = Y for each
agent will be impossible to fund with the total displayed income of y0 <Y.
This makes the full information optimum infeasible outside of the trivial case
in which λ(y) = 0 for all y.
Incontrast,theno-redistributionallocationc(˜ y) =˜ y canalwaysbeimple-
mented with the recommendation for all agents to display all income. Thus,
we see how the need to provide incentives puts a limit on the amount of
redistribution (i.e., social insurance) that can be implemented when income
falsiﬁcation is possible.
What is the maximal amount of social insurance that can be provided
when agents can falsify income? To answer this question, we need to solve
the social planning problem SPP.92 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
A No-Falsiﬁcation Theorem
Problem SPP (deﬁned on page 86) is not very convenient to work with, since
it involves the recommendation ˜ yc, which depends on the allocation c. Each
timewewanttoevaluatewelfaregeneratedbyacandidateredistributionpolicy
c, we need to specify an incentive-compatible display recommendation ˜ yc.
Optimization, therefore, takes place jointly over the choice of c(y) and ˜ yc(y)
for all y ∈ [y0,y 1]. The social planning problem would be much simpler if
we could ﬁx a display recommendation and search only over the consumption
allocations c. It turns out that, in the class of economies we consider, such a
simpliﬁcation is possible.
Supposethatweconﬁneattentiontomechanismsthatrecommendfulldis-
play of income for all realizations of y ∈ [y0,y 1]. We call such mechanisms
no-falsiﬁcation (NF) mechanisms. Below, we prove a result that states that
when searching for an optimal mechanism, conﬁning attention to NF mech-
anisms is without loss of generality. The Revelation Principle implies that
limiting attention to incentive-feasible mechanisms is without loss of welfare.
We show something stronger: it is without loss of welfare to conﬁne attention
to those IF mechanisms that are NF mechanisms.
This result, which we call a no-falsiﬁcation theorem, signiﬁcantly sim-
pliﬁes the social planning problem SPP. It implies that the recommendation
˜ yc can be taken to be ˜ yc(y) = y for all y, independently of the candidate
allocation c. This greatly reduces the dimensionality of the social planning
problem, as now optimization is only over the allocation functions c.
Formally, we will say that an incentive-feasible mechanism (˜ yc,c)is a
no-falsiﬁcation mechanism if
˜ yc(y) = y
for all y ∈ [y0,y 1].
Anincentive-feasible,no-falsiﬁcation(IFNF)mechanismcanbeexpressed
simply as an allocation function c, with ˜ yc implicitly speciﬁed as ˜ yc(y) = y
for all y.
The main result of this section is the following:
Theorem. For any IF mechanism (˜ yc,c), there exists an IFNF mechanism
ˆ c that delivers the same social welfare as (˜ yc,c).
Proof. Let (˜ yc,c) be an IF and resource-feasible mechanism. Deﬁne an
IFNF mechanism ˆ c as follows:




We ﬁrst show that ˆ c is incentive compatible. Suppose it is not. Then, the
incentivecompatibilityconstraint(6)hastobeviolatedat ˆ c, whichmeansthatB. Grochulski: Optimal Taxation with Tax Avoidance 93
there exist y and z ∈  (y) such that




















where the equality follows from the additivity of the deﬁnite integral with









Note now that x ∈  (y). Indeed,
x =˜ yc(z) ∈ suppF,
because x =˜ yc(z) ∈  (z), and
x ≤ z ≤ y, (12)
because z ∈  (y) and x ∈  (z). But this contradicts the incentive compat-
ibility of the mechanism (˜ yc,c),because x is a feasible display level for an
agent with realized income y that provides strictly more consumption (i.e.,
also utility) than the recommended display level ˜ yc(y). This contradiction
implies that ˆ c is incentive compatible.
Welfare generated by ˆ c is equal to welfare generated by (˜ yc,c), as, by
deﬁnition of ˆ c, both mechanisms deliver the same consumption to agents
of all income levels. Note that ˆ c delivers publicly the same consumption that
(˜ yc,c)deliversasasumofpublicandhiddenconsumptionforeachrealization
of income y.94 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
It remains to be shown that ˆ c is resource feasible. The resources needed
to deliver ˆ c are
 y1
y0



























































where (13) follows from (5), that is, the fact that (˜ yc,c)is resource feasible,
and (14) from the fact that
λ(t) ≤ 1
for all t. Since ˆ c is an incentive-compatible, no-falsiﬁcation mechanism,
agents display all income truthfully. Thus, since the amount of resources




ˆ c is resource feasible and the proof is complete.
Remarks
1. Note in the last step of the preceding proof that, in a large class of
environments, inequality (14) is strict. When ˜ yc( y )<yfor some y
such that λ(y) < 1, under the mechanisms (˜ yc(y),c), agents engage in
a wasteful activity of hiding income. Under the NF mechanism ˆ c, this
inefﬁciencyiseliminated. Therefore,wheneverλ<1,NFmechanisms
are not merely as good as falsiﬁcation mechanisms, but strictly better.
2. AkeystepinshowingtheincentivecompatibilityoftheNFmechanism
ˆ c is the equality in (11). This equality holds true because the cost of
hiding the amount y−x is equal to the sum of costs of hiding y−z and
z − x. The proof of our no-falsiﬁcation result would not go through if
the cost of hiding y − x were strictly larger than the sum of costs of
hidingy−zﬁrstandz−x next. InSection7, wediscussanexampleofB. Grochulski: Optimal Taxation with Tax Avoidance 95
such an environment. There, also, we discuss how our no-falsiﬁcation
theorem is related to the results of Lacker and Weinberg (1989).
3. Another important step in the proof involves showing that ˜ yc(z) ∈
 (y). This holds because in our environment it is possible to hide the
whole income. Suppose that there is an upper bound on the proportion
of income that can be hidden. Say only 20 percent of actually realized
income can be hidden. With this bound in place, it may be impossible
todisplay ˜ yc(z)whentrueincomeisy because, despitebeingafeasible
display, for the true income z, ˜ yc(z) may be less than 80 percent of y,
which means that it is not a feasible display for the true income y.
Clearly, this will be the case when 0.8z ≤˜ yc(z) < 0.8y. Thus, under
such a partial concealment technology, our no-falsiﬁcation theorem
fails. This point follows from an insight of Green and Laffont (1986).
Simplifying the Social Planning Problem
By our no-falsiﬁcation theorem, we hereafter conﬁne attention to NF mech-
anisms without loss of generality. The incentive compatibility constraint (4)
of an NF mechanism
y ∈ θc(y),
for all y ∈ [y0,y 1] can be equivalently written as




for all y ∈ [y0,y 1] and all θ ∈  (y).




c(y)dF(y) ≤ Y. (16)
Under an NF mechanism, all consumption is public (as no resources





The social planning problem SPP restricted to the class of no-falsiﬁcation
mechanisms, thus, is to ﬁnd a schedule c(y) so as to maximize social welfare
(17) subject to incentive compatibility (15) and resource feasibility (16).
This formulation of the social planning problem is much simpler (as no
function ˜ yc is involved). It will be useful, however, to simplify it even further.96 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Simplifying the IC Constraints
When suppF contains many points, the number of constraints in the condition
(15) is large, as incentive compatibility of c needs to be checked for all y in
suppF and all ˜ y in suppF below y. This is true, in particular, for the case of
full support, that is, if
suppF = [y0,y 1].
In this section, we show how, in the full support case, incentive compat-
ibility conditions (15) can be equivalently expressed with a smaller number
of so-called local IC constraints. Replacing the global conditions (15) with
the local constraints deﬁned below does not alter the requirement of incentive
compatibility, but the social planning problem is simpler to handle when local
constraints are used.
Deﬁne the local IC constraints as
dc(y) ≥ λ(y)dy (18)
for all y ∈ [y0,y 1]. The notation dc(y) stands for the change in c when y is
changed inﬁnitesimally (similar to the notation dF(y) we have already used
to denote integration with respect to differences in the distribution function
F). If c is differentiable, the above condition reduces to
c (y) ≥ λ(y)
for all y ∈ [y0,y 1].
Intuitively, the local IC constraints prevent agents from hiding small
amounts of output. Take an agent whose realized income is y. The rec-
ommended display under an NF mechanism c is to hide nothing. The agent
considers a small deviation from no-falsiﬁcation, which means hiding a small
amount of income, dy. The private beneﬁt of doing so comes in the form of a
small amount λ(y)dy of resources available to the agent for hidden consump-
tion. The local IC constraint (18) requires that the loss in publicly assigned
consumption resulting from this underreporting, dc(y), be large enough to at
least offset the agent’s gain in hidden consumption.
We show now that, if F has full support, the global IC constraints (15)
and local IC constraints (18) are equivalent.6
If c satisﬁes the global constraints (15), it must also satisfy the local
constraints (18). The global IC constraint (15) at y with display level θ is
given by




Taking the limit θ → y, we obtain (18) at y.
6 In order to avoid technical detail, the argument is presented quite informally.B. Grochulski: Optimal Taxation with Tax Avoidance 97
The local constraints, in turn, guarantee the incentive compatibility of
allocation c in the global sense. To see this, ﬁx an arbitrary y and θ ≤ y, both
in [y0,y 1]. The local IC constraints imply that for all t ∈ [θ,y]w eh a v e
0 ≤ dc(t) − λ(t)dx.












which shows that the global IC constraint is satisﬁed for y and θ. Since the
choice of y and θ was arbitrary, the same is true for all y and θ ≤ y in [y0,y 1]
and, thus, all IC constraints (15) are satisﬁed.
Having shown that local IC constraints are necessary and sufﬁcient for
incentive compatibility of an IFNF mechanism c, we can express the social
planningproblemsimplyasfollows: ﬁndanallocationcthatmaximizessocial
welfare in the class of all allocations that are resource feasible and locally
incentive compatible. The reduction of the original planning problem SPP
to this form is going to pay off now in that the solution to the reduced-form
problem will be easy to ﬁnd.
Solving the Social Planning Problem
Intuitively, the local IC constraints (18) put a lower bound on how ﬂat the dis-
tributionofconsumptioncanbe. Atthefull-insuranceallocation,consumption
distribution cFI is completely ﬂat:
dcFI(y) = 0.
If this distribution cannot be achieved, due to λ(y) > 0, the best distribution
that can be implemented is the one that comes as close to cFI as possible.
Thus, intuition says that the best among all IC allocations should be the one
at which the slope of c(y) is as small as possible at all levels of y. Given the
lower bound imposed by the local IC constraints, this means that the slope of
c at y should be equal to λ(y), for all y.
This intuition is correct as can be seen from the following argument.
Suppose to the contrary there exists an optimal allocation c such that
dc(y ) > λ(y )dy  (19)
for some y  ∈ [y0,y 1]. Consider also an alternative allocation ¯ c, which is
identical to c except in a small neighborhood of y , where ¯ c prescribes a little
moreredistributionthanc. Moreincomeredistributionaty meansthat ¯ cgrows
more slowly in the neighborhood of y  than does c, that is, d¯ c(y )<d c ( y  ).
With a sufﬁciently small increase in the amount redistributed, however, the98 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
differential d¯ c(y ) can be made arbitrarily close to dc(y ). In particular, given
that at c the local incentive constraint around y  is slack, the increase in the
amount redistributed can be made sufﬁciently small so as to have
d¯ c(y ) ≥ λ(y )dy ,
which means that ¯ c is incentive compatible. As under any NF allocation,
agents hide no income under ¯ c, so the amount available for redistribution
under ¯ c is Y. Since ¯ c uses the same amount of resources as c, Y is sufﬁcient to
fund the total consumption promised by ¯ c,s o¯ c is resource feasible. Also, as ¯ c
provides marginally more consumption to agents with higher marginal utility,
it generates higher social welfare than c. This contradicts the optimality of c.
The above argument implies that any optimal allocation, denoted by c∗,
must satisfy
dc∗(y) = λ(y)dy (20)
for all y ∈ [y0,y 1], i.e., all local IC constraints are binding at a solution to
social planning problem.
Note now that the binding local IC constraints pin down the optimal allo-












This formula tells us a lot about the structure of optimal allocation of con-
sumption. It is optimal to assign to an agent with realized income y only as
much consumption as he could guarantee himself by declaring the lowest in-
come realization, y0. The incentive to display y fully is delivered by publicly
giving the agent exactly as much as what he could get by hiding y − y0. The
amount of this “incentive payment” is equal to
 y
y0 λ(t)dt.






















(1 − F(t))λ(t)dt,B. Grochulski: Optimal Taxation with Tax Avoidance 99
which implies that
c∗(y0) = Y −
 y1
y0
(1 − F(t))λ(t)dt. (21)
The optimal amount of consumption assigned to an agent at the very bottom
of income distribution is equal to what it would be in the full-insurance case
(cFI = Y), less the average incentive payment made to other agents whose
income exceeds the low realization y0.
Since the constant c∗(y0) is uniquely determined in (21), the optimal
allocation c∗ is uniquely pinned down as
c∗(y) = Y −
 y1
y0




for all y ∈ [y0,y 1]. Consumption assigned to agents with income y is equal
to the average income, minus the average population incentive payment, plus
the incentive payment speciﬁc to agents of income y.
Asanexample,considerthespecialcaseinwhichthecostofhidingincome
is independent of income, i.e., take λ(y) = λ for all y. In this case, we get




= Y − λ(Y − y0)
= λy0 + (1 − λ)Y,
and
c∗(y) = λy0 + (1 − λ)Y + λ(y − y0)
= λy + (1 − λ)Y.
The optimal assignment of consumption, in this case, does not depend on
the income distribution F. Consumption assigned to agents with income y
is a weighted average of their income y and the average income Y, where
the weight assigned to the average income is equal to the per-dollar income
falsiﬁcation cost 1 − λ. In particular, when this cost is 100 percent, the full-
insurance allocation cFI = Y is implementable. If this cost is zero, no social
insurance can be implemented, and the no-redistribution allocation c(y) = y
is optimal.
6. FISCAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONSTRAINED
OPTIMUM
Theno-falsiﬁcationtheoremdoesnotonlyhelpsolvethesocialplanningprob-
lem, but also makes ﬁscal implementation of the optimum straightforward.
InordertoimplementanIFmechanism(˜ yc,c), weneedtoﬁndanincome
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theincentivecompatibilitycondition(8)andthetransferreplicationcondition
(9). If the mechanism to be implemented is a no-falsiﬁcation mechanism,
however, theincentivecompatibilityconditionfollowsfromthetransferrepli-
cation condition, and thus only one simple condition has to be checked.
Therefore, a tax schedule T implements the optimal IFNF mechanism c∗,
if and only if
c∗(y) = y − T(y)
for all y ∈ [y0,y 1].
This condition uniquely pins down the optimal tax schedule, which will
be denoted by T ∗. Substituting for c∗(y) from (22), we get
T ∗(y) = y −
 y
y0




for all y ∈ [y0,y 1].
As we see, the structure of the optimal tax system T ∗ is determined by the
unit income falsiﬁcation cost function 1−λ. Optimal marginal income taxes
are given by
dT∗(y) = (1 − λ(y))dy.
At all points of continuity of λ, we, thus, have
d
dy
T ∗(y) = 1 − λ(y),
that is, the optimal marginal income tax rate applied to the income level y is
equal to the per-dollar income falsiﬁcation cost at y.
Since our model does not put any restrictions on the shape of the function
λ, a large class of tax schedules T is consistent with optimality under some
speciﬁcationofλ. Inparticular,iftheunitcostofincomefalsiﬁcation1−λ(y)
is increasing in y, progressive taxation of income is optimal in our model.
Clearly, itiseasytoprovideaspeciﬁcationforthefunctionλthatgeneratesan
optimal tax system that is piecewise-linear, similar to the income tax schedule
currently used in the United States.
What, in conclusion, does our model suggest about why we observe pro-
gressive taxation in many countries, including the United States? Our model
shows that, if the cost of falsiﬁcation is increasing in income, it is optimal to
tax higher income at a higher rate because in this way, the maximal amount
of desirable social insurance can be provided without pushing people into
wasteful tax avoidance activities. In this sense, our model provides a possible
explanation for the observed progressivity of income taxes.B. Grochulski: Optimal Taxation with Tax Avoidance 101
7. SOME EXTENSIONSANDALTERNATIVE
SPECIFICATIONS
The no-falsiﬁcation property is a key feature of the optimal mechanism for
the provision of social insurance in the class of environments we have consid-
ered so far. In this section, we study the extent to which our no-falsiﬁcation
theorem can be extended to environments with more general falsiﬁcation cost
technologies.
The class of falsiﬁcation cost functions that we considered so far consists
of all functions that can be expressed as the deﬁnite integral (1). We have
demonstrated that a useful no-falsiﬁcation theorem holds for all such cost
functions. Theproofofthistheoremusestheadditivitypropertyofthedeﬁnite
integral. It turns out, however, that this proof goes through under a weaker
condition of subadditivity of the falsiﬁcation cost function. Therefore, the
no-falsiﬁcation result extends to a larger class of environments than merely
those in which the falsiﬁcation cost function can be expressed as an integral
of the form given in (1).
We identify subadditivity of the falsiﬁcation cost function as a key condi-
tionfortheno-falsiﬁcationresultaswellasfortheoptimalityofno-falsiﬁcation
mechanisms. In the ﬁrst subsection, we show that subadditivity is sufﬁcient
for the no-falsiﬁcation result, which implies that no-falsiﬁcation mechanisms
are optimal whenever the falsiﬁcation cost function is subadditive. In the sec-
ond subsection, we show that no-falsiﬁcation mechanisms are not optimal in
general. We give an example of a falsiﬁcation technology under which all
no-falsiﬁcation mechanisms are welfare-dominated by a mechanism that uses
falsiﬁcation.
Inthethirdandﬁnalsubsection,wediscusstherelationbetweenourmodel
and the costly state falsiﬁcation literature.
A Generalized No-Falsiﬁcation Theorem
Our no-falsiﬁcation theorem can be extended to any subadditive cost function
ψ : D → R+, where
D =

(y,x) ∈ [y0,y 1]2 |x ≤ y

,
and where subadditive means that for all x ≤ z ≤ y, x ≥ y0, y ≤ y1,
we have
ψ(y,x) ≤ ψ(y,z)+ ψ(z,x).
In fact, under this more general speciﬁcation of the falsiﬁcation cost function,
our proof goes through without change. In particular, for any IF mechanism
(˜ yc,c)we deﬁne the no-falsiﬁcation mechanism ˆ c as
ˆ c(y) = c(˜ yc(y)) + y −˜ yc(y) − ψ(y, ˜ yc(y)).102 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
As we work step-by-step through the original proof, it follows that ˆ c is always
at least as good as (˜ yc,c)for any subadditive cost function ψ.
The class of subadditive cost functions contains many ﬂexible speciﬁca-
tions. Therefore, by our no-falsiﬁcation theorem, the class of environments
in which the NF mechanisms are optimal is fairly large.
Is subadditivity of the cost function ψ necessary for the no-falsiﬁcation
result? When the cost function ψ is not subadditive, as mentioned already in
Remark 2 on page 94, our proof of the no-falsiﬁcation theorem does not go
through because from the supposition that the NF mechanism ˆ c is not IC, it
no longer follows that the mechanism (˜ yc,c)is not IC. To see this, note that
the fact that there exists z ∈  (y), such that
ˆ c(y) < ˆ c(z) + y − z − ψ(y,z)
implies that
c(˜ yc(y)) + y −˜ yc(y) − ψ(y, ˜ yc(y)) < c(˜ yc(z)) + z −˜ yc(z)
−ψ(z, ˜ yc(z)) + y − z − ψ(y,z)
= c(˜ yc(z)) + y −˜ yc(z)
−

ψ(y,z)+ ψ(z, ˜ yc(z))

but does not, in general, imply that
c(˜ yc(y)) + y −˜ yc(y) − ψ(y, ˜ yc(y)) < c(˜ yc(z)) + y −˜ yc(z) − ψ(y, ˜ yc(z)).
This last implication fails when
ψ(y, ˜ yc(z)) > ψ(y,z) + ψ(z, ˜ yc(z)),
that is, when the cost of two piecemeal falsiﬁcations is smaller than the cost
of making the same falsiﬁcation in one big step.
We see that when the falsiﬁcation cost function is not subadditive, there
are IC allocations of ﬁnal (private plus hidden) consumption that cannot be
achieved with an NF mechanism. This, in itself, does not imply that NF
mechanisms are sub-optimal. It is possible that the allocations that are not
implementable without falsiﬁcation are welfare dominated by allocations that
canbeimplementedinanNFmechanism. Inthenextsubsection, however, by
means of an example, we show that, in general, this is not true. In fact, under
some income-hiding cost functions, mechanisms that prescribe falsiﬁcation
are optimal.
Optimality of Falsiﬁcation Mechanisms
Inthissubsection,wespecifyaparticularfalsiﬁcationcostfunctionandderive
the best NF mechanism. Then we provide an example of a falsiﬁcation mech-
anism that welfare dominates the best NF mechanism in this environment.
Consider the following falsiﬁcation cost function:
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for all (y,x) ∈ D. Under this speciﬁcation, the ﬁrst δ dollars of income can
be hidden costlessly, while the resource cost of hiding anything in excess of δ
is 100 percent. Clearly, this cost function is not subadditive.
What is the best no-falsiﬁcation mechanism under this cost function? We
see that an allocation c is consistent with no-falsiﬁcation if and only if
dc(y) ≥ dy (24)
for all y. Indeed, if d c ( y )<d y , agents can beneﬁt from hiding up to δ dollars
of income because their hidden consumption increases one-to-one with every
dollar hidden while their public consumption decreases at a slower rate for
falsiﬁcations smaller than δ. Clearly, if dc(y) ≥ dy, then no agent beneﬁts
from hiding income and, thus, no-falsiﬁcation is incentive compatible. Also,
it is clear that among all allocations satisfying (24), the one at which all
constraints (24) bind, provides the most insurance and, hence, the highest ex
ante social welfare among all NF mechanisms. Thus, the best NF mechanism,
denoted as cNF, satisﬁes
dcNF(y) = dy
for all y. Integrating, we get
cNF(y) − cNF(y0) = y − y0
for all y. Resource feasibility implies that
cNF(y0) = y0.
Under the falsiﬁcation cost (24), therefore, the best NF mechanism coincides
with the no-insurance allocation
cNF(y) = y
for all y. Intuitively, since small falsiﬁcations are costless to agents at all
income levels, full display of income is incentive compatible only when there
is no redistribution (taxation) of the displayed income, which means that no
insurance of the individual income risk is possible.
Now consider the following falsiﬁcation mechanism (˜ y¯ c(y), ¯ c):
˜ y¯ c(y) = max{y − δ,y0},
¯ c(y) =¯ c
for all y. In this mechanism, the recommendation function ˜ y¯ c(y) says that
agentsshouldhideδ anddisplayy−δ,o r ,i fy−δ<y 0, agentsshoulddisplay
the lowest income realization y0 and hide y − y0. The redistribution function
¯ c simply assigns a constant amount of resources to all agents, regardless of
their displayed income.
It is easy to see that this mechanism is IC. First, no one has an incentive to
hide less than the recommended amount, because the public consumption al-
location ¯ c(y) =¯ c does not reward agents who display larger income. Second,104 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
hiding more than δ for agents with income y>y 0 + δ yields no additional
hidden consumption because the marginal cost of hiding is 1 for all income
hidden in excess of δ. Finally, hiding more than y − y0 when y<y 0 + δ
violates the support condition ˜ y ∈suppF. Thus, (˜ y¯ c(y), ¯ c) is IC.









Withthischoiceof ¯ c,themechanism(˜ y¯ c(y), ¯ c)isincentivefeasible. Assuming




to an agent with income y,
¯ cph(y) =

y +¯ c − y0 if y<y 0 + δ,
¯ c + δ if y ≥ y0 + δ (25)
is the sum of the public consumption ¯ c and the hidden consumption y −
max{y − δ,y0}.
Clearly,thebestNFmechanismcNF(y) = y andthemechanism(˜ y¯ c(y), ¯ c)
do not provide the same allocation of ﬁnal consumption, and the consumption
proﬁle ¯ cph(y)cannotbereplicatedbyanNFmechanism. Itisnotimmediately
clear, however, that the falsiﬁcation mechanism (˜ y¯ c(y), ¯ c) welfare-dominates
the best NF mechanism cNF(y) = y, as agents at the top of the distribution
of realized income are worse off under (˜ y¯ c(y), ¯ c), relative to the no-insurance
allocation cNF(y) = y. The following argument shows that the best NF
mechanism is in fact suboptimal.
Denote by G(c) the cumulative distribution function of the distribution of
ﬁnal consumption ¯ cph provided by the mechanism (˜ y¯ c(y), ¯ c). That is,
G(c) = Pr

y : ¯ cph(y) ≤ c

= F(¯ cph(c)).




F(c−¯ c) if c ∈ [¯ c, ¯ c + δ),
1i f c>¯ c + δ.
(26)
The cumulative distribution function of consumption provided by the no in-
surance mechanism cNF(y) = y is simply given by F. In this notation, the






u(c)dG(c). (27)B. Grochulski: Optimal Taxation with Tax Avoidance 105
Given that all income hiding that takes place under (˜ y¯ c(y), ¯ c) is costless (i.e.,
no resources are wasted in the process of falsiﬁcation), both consumption






cdF(c) = Y, (28)
which means that G and F are two distributions with the same mean value, Y.
Thus, giventhatuisstrictlyconcave, thewelfaredominationcondition(27)is
literally equivalent to the second-order stochastic domination of distribution
G over distribution F.7 It is a standard result (see, for example, Mas-Colell,
Whinston, and Green 1995) that G second-order stochastically dominates F
if and only if
 c
y0
[F(t)− G(t)]dt ≥ 0 (29)
for all c ∈ [y0,y 1]. We now show that this condition is satisﬁed.
From (26), we get that the difference F(t)−G(t) is positive for t ≤¯ c+δ
and then negative for t>¯ c + δ. The integral on the left-hand side of (29)




[F(t)− G(t)]dt = 0.
Also, naturally, we have
 y0
y0
[F(t)− G(t)]dt = 0.
These end-point conditions and the fact that the integral on the left-hand side
of (29) is ﬁrst increasing and then decreasing imply that the integral on the
left-hand side of (29) is everywhere positive. Thus, (29) is satisﬁed for all
c ∈ [y0,y 1], and G does second-order stochastically dominate F.
Intuitively, the falsiﬁcation mechanism (˜ y¯ c(y), ¯ c) dominates the
no-insurance allocation cNF(y) = y because it manages to provide some
social insurance. At (˜ y¯ c(y), ¯ c), consumption provided to those with the
lowest income y0 is larger than cNF(y0) = y0,a s¯ c>y 0. Also, the consump-
tion proﬁle ¯ cph(y) is everywhere at least weakly ﬂatter than the no-insurance
consumptionproﬁlecNF(y) = y,butnotﬂatterthanthefull-insuranceproﬁle,
at which c(y) is constant. We see then that (˜ y¯ c(y), ¯ c) delivers a consumption
proﬁle intermediate between the no-insurance and full-insurance allocations.
7 By deﬁnition, distribution G second-order stochastically dominates distribution F if, under
any strictly concave utility function, G delivers larger expected utility than F, which is exactly
what our condition (27) requires.106 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Thus, (˜ y¯ c(y), ¯ c) welfare-dominates the no-insurance allocation, that is, the
best allocation among all attainable with an NF mechanism.
Relation to the CSF Literature
In the original paper introducing the costly state falsiﬁcation (CSF) model,
Lacker and Weinberg (1989) (hereafter LW) study a class of falsiﬁcation cost
functions ψ in which the cost of falsiﬁcation depends only on the amount
hidden. In particular, conditional on the amount hidden, the falsiﬁcation cost
does not depend on the actual income realization y. More precisely, the class
of falsiﬁcation cost functions considered in LW consists of such falsiﬁcation
cost functions ψ for which there exists a function g : R → R+ with g(0) = 0
such that
ψ(y,x) = g(y − x) (30)
for all x ≤ y, x ≥ y0, y ≤ y1.
FollowingLW,anumberofpapersineconomicsandﬁnancehaveusedthe
CSF model in a variety of applications. These include managerial incentives
and asset pricing (Lacker, Levy, and Weinberg 1990), optimal insurance con-
tract design (Crocker and Morgan 1998), managerial compensation (Crocker
and Slemrod 2005, forthcoming), investor protection law and growth (Castro,
Clementi, and MacDonald 2004), and optimal dynamic capital structure of
the ﬁrm (DeMarzo and Sannikov 2006). All of these papers consider the LW
speciﬁcation of falsiﬁcation cost function (30).
This article differs from these papers in two respects. First, this article is,
to our knowledge, the ﬁrst to apply the CSF model to the problem of optimal
redistributivetaxation. Second,theclassofintegralfalsiﬁcationcostfunctions
that we consider is different from the LW class, which means that this article
studies a version of the CSF model that has not been previously studied in the
literature.
In the remainder of this subsection, we discuss the relationship between
the LW class of falsiﬁcation cost functions and the class of cost functions
we study in this article. The class considered in this article consists of all
functions ψ that admit the integral representation (1), i.e., such functions ψ





for all x ≤ y, x ≥ y0, y ≤ y1.
Neither the LW class nor our class of falsiﬁcation cost functions is more
general than the other. Clearly, the integral cost function representation we
consider is not a special case of the LW speciﬁcation, as in our model the
cost of hiding a ﬁxed amount of income can depend on the realized incomeB. Grochulski: Optimal Taxation with Tax Avoidance 107
level, y. The LW speciﬁcation is not a special case of the integral representa-
tion,either. Akeypropertyoftheintegralrepresentationisadditivity. TheLW
speciﬁcationencompassesnonadditivecostfunctions,forexample,thenonad-
ditive cost function ψ(y,x) = max{y − x − δ,0} considered in the previous
subsection admits the LW representation with g(h) = max{h − δ,0}, where
h = y − x is the amount hidden.
These two classes of cost functions are not disjoint, for example, the
constant per dollar cost function belongs to both of them. Clearly, if in the
integral representation λ is constant, then
 y
x
(1 − λ(t))dt = (1 − λ)
 y
x
dt = (1 − λ)(y − x) = g(x − y),
where g(h) = (1 − λ)h. Also, there are cost functions ψ that do not belong
to either of the two classes. An example is the function
ψ(y,x) = max{y − x − δ(y),0},
with δ(y) a nonconstant function of y.
8. CONCLUSION
In this article we follow the Mirrlees approach to the question of optimal in-
come taxation. This question is studied in an environment in which agents
can avoid taxes by concealing income. The structure of the optimal income
tax schedule is determined by the properties of the income concealment tech-
nology. The main result obtained shows that, if the cost of concealment is
increasingwithincome, itisoptimaltotaxhigherincomeatahighermarginal
rate because, in this way, the maximal amount of desirable social insurance
canbeprovidedwithoutpushingpeopleintowastefultaxavoidanceactivities.
In this sense, our model provides a possible explanation for the progressiv-
ity of income taxes that we observe in many countries, including the United
States.
As an auxiliary result, we prove a no-falsiﬁcation theorem for the class of
CSF environments in which the concealment technology is characterized by
subadditivity of the concealment cost function. We demonstrate that, in this
class of environments, it is without loss of generality to restrict attention to
mechanisms that recommend full display of all realized income for agents of
all income levels. This result can be useful more generally, that is, in different
applications of the CSF model.
Several possible lines of extension of our model are worth mentioning.
First, in contrast to the Mirrlees environments, the realized (pre-concealment)
income is exogenous in our model. In particular, pre-concealment income
does not respond to taxation. In a richer environment, the falsiﬁcation ef-
fect that we study in this article would be only one of several forces shaping
optimal tax structures. Second, the class of income falsiﬁcation technolo-108 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
gies considered in the model is large, which allows for a large variety of tax
structures to be consistent with optimality under some concealment technol-
ogy. Grounding the model more fundamentally in technology could provide
sharper predictions about the structure of optimal taxes. Third, and related,
falsiﬁcation technology is taken as exogenous in the model. In particular, it
cannotbeaffectedbythegovernment. Theresultsobtainedcouldchangeifthe
scope of tax avoidance activities available to the agents is explicitly modeled
as dependent on government policy.
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